Oblivious transfer (OT) protocols mainly contain three categories: 1-out-of-2 OT, 1-out-of-n OT, and k-out-of-n OT. In most cases, they are treated as cryptographic primitives and are usually executed without consideration of possible attacks that might frequently occur in an open network, such as an impersonation, replaying, or man-in-the-middle attack. Therefore, when used in certain applications, such as mental poker games and fair contract signings, some extra mechanisms must be combined to ensure the security of the protocol. However, after a combination, we found that very few of the resulting schemes are efficient enough in terms of communicational cost, which is a significant concern for generic commercial transactions. Therefore, we propose a novel k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol based on bilinear pairing, which not only satisfies the requirements of a k-out-of-n OT protocol, but also provides mutual authentication to resist malicious attacks. Meanwhile, it is efficient in terms of communication cost.
Introduction
An oblivious transfer (OT) is an important primitive for designing security services. It can be used in various applications like the signing of fair contracts, oblivious database searches, mental poker games, privacy-preserving auctions, secure multiparty computations [1] , and so on. In 1981, Rabin [2] first proposed an interactive OT scheme in which the probability of the receiver's capability to decrypt a message sent by the sender is 1/2. Rabin used the proposed OT to design a 3-pass secret exchange (EOS) protocol, hoping that two parties can exchange their secrets fairly. In 1985, Even et al. [3] presented a more generalized OT, called 1-out-of-2 OT (OT 2 1 ), in which a sender sends two encrypted messages to a chooser with only one of which the chooser can decrypt. They also presented a contract-signing protocol by evoking OT 2 1 multiple times to prevent one party from obtaining the other party's contract signature without first showing his own. In 1986, Brassard et al. [4] further extended OT 2 1 into a 1-out-of-n OT (OT n 1 , also known as "allor-nothing"), in which only one out of n sent messages can actually be obtained by the chooser. The authors pointed out that their OT n 1 scheme can be used to implement a multiparty mental poker game [5] against a player coalition. In contrast to the interactive versions described above, Bellare and Micali [6] first proposed a noninteractive OT 2 1 scheme in 1989. In this scheme, a user obliviously transfers two messages to another party equipped with two public keys to decrypt one of the messages.
From 1999 to 2001, based on the above-mentioned interactive and noninteractive OT schemes, Naor and Pinkas proposed some related OT methods, such as an adaptive OT n k [7] , proxy OT 2 1 [8] , distributed OT n k [9] , efficient OT n 1 [10] , and efficient OT n k [11] . Here, OT n k is the final form of the OT schemes. In this form, from the n encrypted messages sent, the chooser can obtain k chosen messages in plaintext form without the sender's knowledge regarding which part of the messages are decrypted. In Naor and Pinkas's distributed OT n k schemes [9] , the sender distributes two messages (M 0 , M 1 ) among n servers, and the chooser contacts k (k < n) servers to receive one (M σ , σ = 0 or 1) of them. The authors claimed that their schemes can protect the privacy of both parties. However, in 2007, Ghodosi [12] showed two possible attacks on these schemes. In 2 Advances in Multimedia the first attack, two collaborating servers can reveal the chooser's choice of σ, while, in the second attack, the chooser can learn both M 0 and M 1 by colluding with only a single server. In 2002, Mu et al. [13] proposed three OT n k schemes constructed using RSA encryption, a NybergRueppel signature, and an ElGamal encryption scheme, respectively. Two of these are interactive, while the other can be either interactive or noninteractive. The authors claimed that their schemes are complete, robust, and flexible and induce a significant improvement in communication cost. However, in 2006, Ghodosi and Zaare-Nahandi [14] showed that these schemes fail to satisfy the requirements of an oblivious transfer protocol. In 2004, Ogata and Kurosawa [15] proposed another OT n k scheme, based on an RSA blind signature, which can be employed in either an adaptive or a nonadaptive manner. The authors claimed that their scheme can be applied to oblivious key searching. In 2005, three OT n k schemes are proposed [16] [17] [18] . Among these, Chu and Tzeng's scheme [16] is the most efficient as it needs only 2 passes to send 1024 k bits from the chooser to the sender, and 1024 * (k + 1) + n * |Data| bits from the sender to the chooser, where Data is a message or ciphertext, and |Data| represents the bit length of Data. In 2006, Parakh [19] proposed an elliptic-curve-based algorithm allowing A to obliviously transfer his secrecy, n A , to B with a 50% probability of success. However, we found that A can decide whether B can obtain his secret n A (which is one-to-one mapped to Pn A ) by first assuming that P A = P B . Under this assumption, upon receiving {n B P B ; n B (n A P A ) + R; n B R} from B, A can obtain B's one-time random variable R by computing (n B (n A P A ) + R) − n A (n B P B ). Then, by computing n A (n B R) = n B (n A R), A can obtain n B K. Subsequently, by computing (n A (n B R) + Pn A ) − n B K, A obtains Z B , just as B does in step 5(b). Therefore, if A finds Z B = Pn A , it confirms that B can obtain n A after the protocol runs; otherwise, it knows B cannot obtain the value of n A . This violates B's privacy. In the same year, for coping with all possible attacks encountered in an open network, Kim and Lee [20] proposed two OT 2 1 protocols, which are modified from Bellare-Micali noninteractive OT 2 1 scheme [6] by appending the sender's signature to make the sender undeniable about what he sent and be authentic to the chooser. However, we found, other than the weaknesses pointed by Chang and Shiao [21] , Kohnfelder's protocol still has the reblocking problem [22] . Because when modulus n A > n B , message M A cannot be recovered by Bob. This makes legal Alice unable to be authenticated by Bob.
In 2007, Halevi and Kalai [23] proposed another OT 2 1 scheme by using smooth projective hashing and showed that the used RSA composite in their scheme need not be a product of safe primes. Also in 2007, Camenish et al. and Green and Hohenberger proposed two related OT schemes [24, 25] , respectively. Both focus on the security of full simulatability for the sender and receiver to resist against selective-failure attack [7] . In 2009, Qin et al. [26] proposed two noninteractive OT n 1 schemes. However, in their protocols, a receiver has to interact with a third party to obtain the choice-related secret key each time it wants to select one of the n sent message. This makes their scheme somewhat inconvenient and inconsistent with the meaning of noninteractive protocols as indicated in the title (this phenomenon can also be found in some proposed noninteractive OT schemes). In the same year, Chang and Lee [27] presented a robust OT n k scheme using both the RSA blind signature and Chinese Remainder Theorem. However, we found their scheme fails since the sender can decide which parts of the messages were chosen by the chooser. We will describe this weakness in Section 3.2. In addition, in 2011, Ma et al. [28] proposed an oblivious transfer using a privacy scheme for a timed-release receiver. Their scheme has a good timed-release property. However, it needs to call ZKP k times to learn k of the n sent messages. This makes their protocol less efficient. Moreover, it does not have mutual authentication. Therefore, when the sender and receiver want to communicate, they need a secure channel. Otherwise, without identity authentication, malicious attackers can simultaneously launch many ZKPs. This will degrade the system performance and may cause the system to suffer from a denial-of-service (DOS) attack (according to the definition in [29] ).
After surveying all of the above-mentioned OT schemes, we found that almost all of them lack the consideration of adding security features. Only [2, 20] do consider the protection against all possible attacks. However, study [20] fails which we have described earlier. Hence, if we wish all of the proposed OT protocols, other than scheme [2] , to be able to resist against various attacks, we should run them through secure channels. This would incur extra communicational overhead. For this reason, in this paper, we propose a novel interactive OT n k scheme that needs only two passes but can get rid of using a secure channel to avoid adding extra communicational overhead. It not only is simple in concept but also encompasses some essential security features such as mutual authentication, the prevention of man-in-the-middle (MIMA) attack, and replay attack. Thus, when compared with other interactive OT schemes, our scheme promotes not only in the communicational efficiency but also in the aspect of security.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The introduction has been presented in Section 1, and some preliminaries are shown in Section 2. In Section 3, we review Chang et al.'s scheme and show its weakness. After that, we show our protocol in Section 4. Then, the security analyses and communicational cost comparisons among related works and our scheme are made in Section 5. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the security features of our OT n k scheme in Section 2.1, the principles of bilinear pairing in Section 2.2, and some intractable problems used in this paper in Section 2.3.
Security Features of Our
OT n k Scheme. Just as traditional OT schemes, our OT n k also has two parties, the sender S and the chooser C. In the scheme, S obliviously transfers n messages to C, and C can choose k messages among them without S's knowledge about which k messages were selected, where n ≥ 2 and k < n. In addition, our scheme also possesses the following three security features which are needed in a traditional OT scheme.
(1) Correctness. After the protocol run, C should be able to obtain the valid data chosen by him before.
(2) Chooser's Privacy. In the protocol, each of the k chooser's choices should not be known to the sender or any third party. More precisely, each of the chooser's encrypted choice can be any valid choice with equal probability, that is, for an encrypted choice y and any valid choice x, Pr[
. This property is known as Shannon perfect secrecy.
(3) Sender's Privacy. At end of the protocol run, the chooser cannot get any knowledge about the other messages it did not choose. More formally, the ciphertexts sent by the sender are semantically secure [30] . The chooser can obtain a plaintext decrypted from its ciphertext only if it has the key offered by the sender.
Except for the above three properties, our interactive OT n k scheme also has the following three security features, (4) through (6), to guard against possible security threats.
(4) Impersonation Attack Resistance. Each party has to authenticate the counterpart. That is, it should be a mutualauthentication OT.
(5) Replaying Attack
Resistance. An adversary could not obtain any messages by only replaying old messages sent by the sender.
MIMA is an attack that an adversary eavesdropping on the communication line between two communicating parties uses as some means to make them believe that they each are talking to the intended party. But indeed, they are talking to the adversary.
Bilinear Pairing.
Let G 1 be an additive group composed of points on an elliptic curve with order q, and let G 2 be a multiplicative group with the same order. A bilinear mapping is defined as e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 which must satisfy the following properties [31] .
(1) Bilinear: a mapping e : (6) Distributive: for all P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ∈ G 1 , e(P 1 + P 2 , P 3 ) = e(P 1 , P 3 ) e(P 2 , P 3 ).
Some Diffie-Hellman Problems. Let a, b, c, g∈ R Z *
q , let P be a base point of a group on an Elliptic curve, and let G = g , G 1 = P , and G 2 = g(= e(P, P)) be three groups with each having a prime order q. Using these definitions, we describe some well-known intractable Diffie-Hellman problems [32] that will be used in this paper.
According to Boneh and Franklin's study [31] , the BCDH problem is no harder than the CDH problem in G (or equivalently G 2 ).
hash function, let T(·) be a target oracle which returns a random element in G, and (·)
c a helper oracle which returns T( j) c when queried by T( j), where c is an unknown random integer in Z * q . Also, let q t be the number of queries to T(·) and q h the number of queries to (·) c . The CTCDH problem is finding l pairs of ( j 1 , v 1 ), . . . , and (j l , v l ), with each satisfying v i = (T( j i )) c , for 1 ≤ i ≤ l and q h < l ≤ q t . Without loss of generality, we can let q h and q t be l − 1 and l, respectively. The CTCDH problem can then be rephrased as that after obtaining
via querying the T(·) oracle and the helper oracle (·)
c correspondingly, trying to find the lth pair ( j l , v l ) without the knowledge of c. The CTCDH problem is proposed and considered as a hard problem by Boldyreva in 2002 [33] . Its former version in RSA is proved by Bellare et al. in [34] .
Review of Chang et al.'s Protocol
In 2009, Chang et al. proposed a robust OT n k scheme based on CRT, hoping that their scheme can achieve the security requirements of a general OT n k scheme. However, we found their scheme cannot satisfy the chooser's privacy. In the following, we first review the scheme in Section 3.1 then show the weakness found in Section 3.2.
Review.
We roughly describe the protocol by listing the relevant steps in the following (see [27] for more details).
Step 1. After receiving the request from Bob for all messages a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n , Alice owning these n messages selects n relatively prime integers, d 1 
Furthermore, Alice computes the following values:
. ., and T n = d e n mod N, where N be the product of two large primes and (e, d) be Alice public/private key pair satisfying ed = 1 mod ϕ(N), by using her public key e. Finally, she publishes C and the n pairs of (ID i , T i ), for i = 1 to n, in the public board.
Step 2. If Bob wants to learn k messages among them, he must select k pairs of (ID j , T j ), for j = 1 to k, from the public board and first generate k corresponding random numbers r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r k , for each pair of (ID j , T j ). Then, he subsequently computes the following:
by using Alice's public key e and sends {α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α k } back to Alice.
Step 3. Upon receiving the messages sent by Bob, Alice employs her private key d to compute Step 4. After receiving the messages from Alice, Bob computes the following values:
Consequently, Bob learns the demanded messages successfully by computing 
That is, Alice will find a match, α 1 , and knows that Bob chose the first message. Conversely, if Alice uses d
e mod N, which is not equal to α 1 . In other words, Alice cannot know the correct message T 1 that Bob chose. That is, once a pair, (α i ( * ) , α i ), for example, has been matched, Alice knows that Bob chose the ith message. Hence, we can easily see that such explorations cost at most n * k multiplications to obtain r ji , and n 2 * k multiplications and n 2 * k exponentiations to yield all values of α ( * ) i . Therefore, with at most (n 2 * k + n * k) multiplications and n 2 * k exponentiations, it is computationally feasible for Alice to decide which k values Bob selected, which violates Bob's privacy.
Proposed Protocol
In this section, we present our ID-based OT n k protocol based on bilinear pairings, which were proved and applied to cryptography by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [31] . Our scheme consists of two phases: (1) an initialization phase and (2) an oblivious transfer phase. In the following, we first describe these two phases. Then, to demonstrate the chooser's privacy preservation, we use a misleading attack for an explanation. As the receiver's privacy preservation can be reasoned in a similar fashion, we omit its description here.
(1) Initialization Phase. In this phase, we adopt the same system parameters as the ones used in [31] . In addition, there also exists a trusted key generation center (KGC) which is assumed to be key-escrow-attack free. Initially, KGC chooses an additive group G 1 = P of order q, a multiplicative group G 2 = e(P, P) of the same order, where e is a bilinear mapping, that is, e : as its private master key and computes the corresponding system public key as P pub = sP. Then, KGC publishes the system parameter set {G 1 , G 2 , q, e, P, P pub , H, H 1 , H 2 }. After that, when a user U (sender/chooser) registers his identifier ID U , KGC will compute a public/private key pair U pub /U priv for him, where U pub = H 1 (ID U ) and U priv = sU pub .
(2) Oblivious Transfer Phase. In this phase, when a sender possessing n messages (m 1 , m 2 ,. . ., and m n ) wants to obliviously transfer k messages of them (m σ1 , m σ2 , . . . , and m σk ) to a chooser, they together will execute the following steps, where the public/private key pairs of the sender and chooser are S pub /S priv and C pub /C priv , respectively, and {σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ k } ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} are the set of k choices selected by the chooser in advance. We also depict them in Table 1 .
Step 1. The chooser randomly chooses two integers a, b ∈ Z * q and computes V = abC pub , V j = bH(σ j )C priv , where j = 1, 2, . . . , k and V j are the k random choices. After that, he generates a signature Sig on V by computing h = H 2 (V ) and Sig = hC priv . Then, he sends ID c , V , V 1 , . . . , V k together with Sig to the sender. Step 2. After receiving IDc, V , V 1 , . . . , V k and Sig from the chooser, the sender computes h = H 2 (V ) and verifies the chooser's signature by checking whether the equation e(P, Sig)= e(P pub , hC pub ) holds. If it holds, he believes that the chooser is the intended party as claimed. Then, the sender randomly chooses an integer c ∈ Z * q and computes
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c , where j = 1, . . . , k, i = 1, . . . , n, and m i are the n messages. He/She then sends U 1 , . . . , U k , ct 1 , . . . , and ct n to the chooser.
Step 3. After receiving the message U 1 , . . . , U k , ct 1 , . . ., and ct n from the sender, the chooser can obtain the k intended messages by at most computing the equation,
(3) A Misleading Attack for Chooser's Privacy Preservation.
To demonstrate the chooser's privacy more clearly, we take the following as a counterexample. According to step 1 in our protocol, the chooser computes V 1 , . . . , V k , where V j = bH(σ j )C priv and j = 1 to k. Since b and C priv are both the same for V i and V j , a misleading attack may be that
After receiving V 1 , . . . , V k from the chooser, he computes each V i /V j for all i, j in [1, k] for a comparison with the precomputed values. Consequently, the sender may guess some or all of the chooser's choices. Therefore, the protocol cannot achieve chooser privacy. However, the mistake here is that both V i and V j are points in the additive group G 1 . The division operation V i /V j is invalid because G 1 is an additive group.
Security Analysis
In this section, we use the following claims to show that our protocol not only is correct but also possesses the properties of mutual authentication, chooser's privacy, and sender's privacy and can resist against active attacks such as relay attack, man-in-the-middle attack, and denial of service attack.
Claim 1. The proposed protocol is correct.
Proof. After the protocol runs, the chooser can exactly obtain the k messages which he/she selected by computing 
(4)
Claim 2. The proposed protocol can achieve mutual authentication.
Proof. We show the holdness of this claim by using the following two reasons.
(1) Apparently, it can be easily seen that the sender can authenticate the chooser by verifying the chooser's signature, Sig (as described in step 2 of the oblivious transfer phase).
(2) For that the ciphertext ct i (= m i ⊕ e(H(i)V , S priv ) c ) contains the sender's private key S priv (= sS pub ), the chooser can compute the meaningful message m σj only via using the sender's public key S pub (also refer to the equation in claim 1). This means that only the true sender can produce the right ct i and thus can be authenticated by the chooser using his public key.
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Claim 3. The proposed protocol can achieve the chooser's privacy.
Proof. Due to the fact that each of the chooser's k choices σ j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} are first hashed and randomized by H and b respectively, and then signed as V j = bH(σ j )C priv by chooser C in step 1, where b is a random number. We argue that nobody except for the chooser can know the choice σ j . Because even an attacker might steal the chooser's private key C priv , he/she cannot obtain bH(σ j ) from V j owing to the hardness of ECDLP. That is, he cannot figure out bH(σ j ), and therefore not to mention σ j . More formally, let
consists of all the possible ordered pairs (b, σ j ) satisfying the equation bH(σ j )C priv = V j . If we are given a value V j , then under fixed C priv , there only exists a unique value bH(σ j ) satisfying the equation. And for a given bH(σ j ), under the definition of a collision-free one-way hash function, once σ j has been determined, the value of b is determined as well. That is, the relationship between b and σ j is one-to-one. Having this observation in mind and the dimension of σ j is n, we can see that there are n (b, σ j ) pairs in A. In other words, Pr [σ j | V j ] = Pr [σ j ] = 1/n which means that, under seeing a specific V j , the choice σ j of the chooser cannot be revealed other than guessing. This achieves the Shannon perfect secrecy. Therefore, the proposed protocol possesses chooser's privacy.
Claim 4.
The proposed scheme can achieve the sender's privacy.
Proof. Assume that malicious chooser C wants to obtain more than k messages in the protocol. If he/she could succeed, then, the sender's privacy is violated (see Section 2.1). However, we will prove that, other than his k chosen messages, it is computationally infeasible for C to obtain the (k + 1)th message by using the following two arguments, (I) and (II). In argument (I), we show why C must follow the protocol to form the values of V and kV j s; otherwise, he/she cannot obtain the k chosen messages. In argument (II), we show that if C intends to obtain the (k+1)th message, he/she will face the intractable CTCDH problem under the assumption that H(·) is a random hash function.
Argument (I)
. C must follow the protocol to form the values of V (= ab C pub ) and V j (= bH(σ j ) C priv ), for j = 1 to k; otherwise, he cannot obtain the k chosen messages, m σ1 , . . . , m σj .
In the following, we further divide this argument into three cases: (a) C fakes V but forms V j honestly, (b) C fakes V j but forms V honestly, and (c) C fakes both the values of V and V j . (For each case's explanation, refer to Table 1.) (a) C fakes V but forms V j honestly. Assume that C is dishonest in forming V but forms V j honestly as specified in the protocol. For example, without loss of generality, it replaces V with a specific X ∈ G 1 and computes (b) C fakes V j s but forms V honestly. Assume that C is dishonest in forming V j s but forms V in the same manner as specified in the protocol. For example, without loss of generality, he replaces each V j with a specified X j ∈ G 1 and computes V = ab C pub . Then, the sender will compute (c) C fakes both the values of V and V j . Without loss of generality, we assume that C replaces V with X and also fakes V j as H(σ j )X. Under this construction, the value of U j computed by the sender would be U j = cV j = cH(σ j )X and the ciphertexts ct σj would be m σj ⊕ e(H(σ j )X, S priv ) c , for j = 1 to k, or equivalently, ct σj = m σj ⊕ e(cH(σ j )X, S priv ). Although, C knows the value of cH(σ j )X (since it just equals to U j received from the sender), it still cannot compute e(cH(σ j )X, S priv ) without the knowledge of S priv . From above description, we know that when the setting of V is X and V j is H(σ j )X, C cannot obtain m σj . Not to mention, C might set V j as H(σ j )Y , where Y ( / = X) is a random chosen element in G 1 . In summary, C cannot obtain the k selected messages under the violation of setting both the values, V and V j .
Argument (II).
If C follows the protocol honestly to obtain k messages, but intends to extract the (k + 1)th message then it will face the intractable CTCDH problem under the assumption that H(·) is a random hash function. 1 's work demands. Therefore, their scheme has the most expensive communicational cost. As for Camenisch et al.'s protocol [24] , the communicational cost is expensive as well due to the complexity of the protocol. In their protocol, the sender first sends n commitments to the chooser, and then the sender and the chooser together run a proof-ofknowledge (Pok) subprotocol for assuring the correctness of the commitments. If the proof is valid, the sender sends n ciphertexts to the chooser, and the chooser then runs the BlindExtract subprotocol k times with the help of the sender to extract the blind choices to decrypt the ciphertexts.
Consequently, the number of passes for executing protocol [24] is 2 + k * Pok, where Pok represents the required passes for executing the proof-of-knowledge subprotocol. Besides, the NTDS from chooser to sender is estimated as |Pok| + k * |BlindExtract| and from sender to chooser is n * |ciphertext| + |Pok| + k * |BlindExtract|. Similarly, the passes and NTDS of other studies can be estimated in the same manner. We show the comparison results in Table 2 .
From Table 2 , we can see that our scheme not only possesses the mutual authentication function but also is the most efficient in both needed passes and NTDS among these related. Therefore, our scheme can be gracefully used when applied in commercial applications (e.g., Kerschbaum et al.'s method [1] used OT scheme as a building block in constructing RFID benchmarking protocols).
Conclusion
An OT scheme which is secure and efficient in communicational cost is essential and eager for commercial applications. After reviewing most of the OT schemes, we found that, other than considering the protocol's correctness and privacy of both communication parties, almost all of them lack the security services, such as mutual authentication, and the prevention of replay, DOS, and main-in-the-middle attacks. Hence, they should run under a secure channel when applied in commercial applications. This will increase execution overhead. Therefore, to get rid of using the secure channel (for improving the communicational efficiency in some applications, such as mental poker playing, oblivious key searching), we propose a novel k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocol by combining an OT scheme with a security mechanism based on bilinear pairing. We have proved that our scheme not only is correct but also possesses the properties of mutual authentication, the sender's privacy, and the chooser's privacy and can resist against replay and MIMA attacks. Further, we have compared our scheme with other nonadaptive k-out-of-n OT schemes in the aspects of needed passes, NTDS, and the function of mutual authentication and shown the result in Table 2 . From Table 2 , we can see that our scheme is the most efficient in communicational cost (including needed passes and NTDS). In addition, to our knowledge, it is the only OT n k scheme that has successfully integrated the function of mutual authentication nowadays.
